Truth and falsehood for non-representationalists: Gorgias on the normativity of language

Sophists and rhetoricians like Gorgias are often accused of disregarding truth and rationality: their speeches seem to aim only at effective persuasion, and be constrained by nothing but persuasiveness itself. In his extant texts Gorgias claims that language does not represent external objects or communicate internal states, but merely generates behavioural responses in people. It has been argued that this perspective erodes the possibility of rationally assessing speeches by making persuasiveness the only norm, and persuasive power the only virtue, of speech. Against this view, I show how Gorgias’ texts support a robust normativity of language that goes well beyond persuasion while remaining non-representational. Gorgias’ claims that a speech can be persuasive and false, or true and unpersuasive, reveal pragmatic, epistemic, and agonistic constraints on the validity of speech that are neither representational nor reducible to sheer persuasiveness

Can reason establish the goals of action? Assessing interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of agency

Scholarship on Aristotle’s theory of action has recently veered toward an intellectualist position, according to which reason is in charge of setting the goals of action. This position has recently been criticized by an anti-intellectualism revival, according to which character, and not reason, sets the goals of action. I argue that neither view can sufficiently account for the complexities of Aristotle’s theory, and suggest a middle way that combines the strengths of both while avoiding their pitfalls. The key problem for intellectualism is that Aristotle explicitly states reason cannot set the goals of action. The key problem for anti-intellectualism is that he also holds that the soul’s rational part must guide and prescribe over the non-rational part. I propose indirect intellectualism, a promising middle path

Social media and self-control: The vices and virtues of attention

Self-control, the capacity to resist temptations and pursue longer-term goals over immediate gratifications, is crucial in determining the overall shape of our lives, and thereby in our ability to shape our identities. As it turns out, this capacity is intimately linked with our ability to control the direction of our attention. This raises the worry that perhaps social media are making us more easily distracted people, and therefore less able to exercise self-control. Is this so? And is it necessarily a bad thing? This paper analyzes the nature of attention, its vices and virtues, and what currently available evidence has to say about the effects of social media on attention and self-control. The pattern that seems to be emerging is that, although there is an association between higher use of social media and lower attentional control, we do not yet know whether it is social media use that makes people more distracted, or whether those who use social media the most do so because they are more easily distracted. Either way, the rise of the ‘Web 2.0’ does raise questions about whether the virtues of attention will change in the future, and whether this will bring with it a transformation in the way we shape our selves

Remembering as a mental action

Many philosophers consider that memory is just a passive information retention and retrieval capacity. Some information and experiences are encoded, stored, and subsequently retrieved in a passive way, without any control or intervention on the subject’s part. In this paper, we will defend an active account of memory according to which remembering is a mental action and not merely a passive mental event. According to the reconstructive account, memory is an imaginative reconstruction of past experience. A key feature of the reconstructive account is that given the imperfect character of memory outputs, some kind of control is needed. Metacognition is the control of mental processes and dispositions. Drawing from recent work on the normativity of automaticity and automatic control, we distinguish two kinds of metacognitive control: top-down, reflective control, on the one hand, and automatic, intuitive, feeling-based control on the other. Thus, we propose that whenever the mental process of remembering is controlled by means of intuitive or feeling-based metacognitive processes, it is an action

Racionalidad práctica, hábito y cuidado en Aristóteles

(Eng) Interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of action in the last few decades has tended toward an intellectualist position, according to which reason is in charge of setting the goals of action. This position has recently been criticized by the revival of anti-intellectualism (particularly from J. Moss’ work), according to which character, and not reason, sets the goals of action. In this essay I argue that neither view can sufficiently account for the complexities of Aristotle’s theory, and propose an intermediate account, which I call indirect intellectualism, that preserves the merits of both traditional interpretations and is able to dispel the problems that trouble each. There is very strong textual evidence for the claim that goal-setting is the task not of reason but of character (and in this anti-intellectualists are right); but reason is able to set goals indirectly by carefully shaping the processes of habituation that constitute a person’s character (and in this intellectualists are right). I argue for this position through a study of the division of labour between character and reason, and through a reconstruction of Aristotle’s conception of habituation.(Spa) En las últimas décadas, la interpretación de la teoría de la acción de Aristóteles ha tendido hacia una postura intelectualista, según la cual la razón está a cargo de establecer los fines de las acciones. Un resurgimiento del anti- intelectualismo, según el cual establecer los fines es tarea del carácter y no de la razón, ha puesto esta postura bajo crítica (particularmente de la mano de J. Moss). Este ensayo sostiene que ninguna de las dos interpretaciones puede dar cuenta suficiente de las complejidades de la teoría de Aristóteles, y propone una postura intermedia, que llamo intelectualismo indirecto, que preserva los méritos de ambas interpretaciones tradicionales y a la vez logra disipar los problemas que aquejan a cada una. Existe muy sólida evidencia textual a favor de la tesis según la cual establecer fines es tarea no de la razón sino del carácter (y en esto los anti-intelectualistas están en lo correcto); pero también es necesario reconocer que la razón puede establecer fines indirectamente, a través del cuidado de los procesos de habituación que constituyen el carácter de una persona (y en esto los intelectualistas están en lo cierto). Defiendo esta interpretación a través de un estudio de los pasajes que señalan una división del trabajo entre el carácter y la razón, y de una reconstrucción de la concepción aristotélica de la habituación

Do we reflect while performing skillful actions? Automaticity, control, and the perils of distraction

From our everyday commuting to the gold medalist’s world-class performance, skillful actions are characterized by fine-grained, online agentive control. What is the proper explanation of such control? There are two traditional candidates: intellectualism explains skillful agentive control by reference to the agent’s propositional mental states; anti-intellectualism holds that propositional mental states or reflective processes are unnecessary since skillful action is fully accounted for by automatic coping processes. I examine the evidence for three psychological phenomena recently held to support anti-intellectualism and argue that it supports neither traditional candidate, but an intermediate attention-control account, according to which the top-down, intention-directed control of attention is a necessary component of skillful action. Only this account recognizes both the role of automatic control in skilled action and the need for higher-order cognition to thread automatic processes together into a unified, skillful performance. This applies to bodily skillful action in general, from the world-class performance of experts to mundane, habitual action. The attention-control account stresses that, for intentions to play their role as top-down modulators of attention, agents must sustain the intention’s activation; hence, the need for reflecting throughout performance

Practical Reason, Habit, and Care in Aristotle

Interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of action in the last few decades has tendedtoward an intellectualist position, according to which reason is in charge ofsetting the goals of action. This position has recently been criticized by therevival of anti-intellectualism (particularly from J. Moss’ work), accordingto which character, and not reason, sets the goals of action. In this essayI argue that neither view can sufficiently account for the complexities ofAristotle’s theory, and propose an intermediate account, which I call indirectintellectualism, that preserves the merits of both traditional interpretationsand is able to dispel the problems that trouble each. There is very strongtextual evidence for the claim that goal-setting is the task not of reason butof character (and in this anti-intellectualists are right); but reason is ableto set goals indirectly by carefully shaping the processes of habituationthat constitute a person’s character (and in this intellectualists are right).I argue for this position through a study of the division of labour betweencharacter and reason, and through a reconstruction of Aristotle’s conceptionof habituation.En las últimas décadas, la interpretación de la teoría de la acción de Aristótelesha tendido hacia una postura intelectualista, según la cual la razón está acargo de establecer los fines de las acciones. Un resurgimiento del antiintelectualismo,según el cual establecer los fines es tarea del carácter y no dela razón, ha puesto esta postura bajo crítica (particularmente de la mano de J.Moss). Este ensayo sostiene que ninguna de las dos interpretaciones puede darcuenta suficiente de las complejidades de la teoría de Aristóteles, y proponeuna postura intermedia, que llamo intelectualismo indirecto, que preservalos méritos de ambas interpretaciones tradicionales y a la vez logra disiparlos problemas que aquejan a cada una. Existe muy sólida evidencia textual afavor de la tesis según la cual establecer fines es tarea no de la razón sino delcarácter (y en esto los anti-intelectualistas están en lo correcto); pero tambiénes necesario reconocer que la razón puede establecer fines indirectamente, através del cuidado de los procesos de habituación que constituyen el carácterde una persona (y en esto los intelectualistas están en lo cierto). Defiendoesta interpretación a través de un estudio de los pasajes que señalan unadivisión del trabajo entre el carácter y la razón, y de una reconstrucción dela concepción aristotélica de la habituación

Is a bad will a weak will? Cognitive dispositions modulate folk attributions of weakness of will

In line with recent efforts to empirically study the folk concept of weakness of will, we examine two issues in this paper: (1) How is weakness of will attribution [WWA] influenced by an agent’s violations of best judgment and/or resolution, and by the moral valence of the agent’s action? (2) Do any of these influences depend on the cognitive dispositions of the judging individual? We implemented a factorial 2x2x2 between–subjects design with judgment violation, resolution violation, and action valence as independent variables, and measured participants’ cognitive dispositions using Frederick’s Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT]. We conclude that intuitive and reflective individuals have two different concepts of weakness of will. The study supports this claim by showing that: a) the WWA of intuitive subjects is influenced by the action’s (and probably also the commitment’s) moral valence, while the WWA of reflective subjects is not; b) judgment violation plays a small role in the WWA of intuitive subjects, while reflective subjects treat resolution violation as the only relevant trait. Data were collected among students at two different universities. All subjects (N=710) answered the CRT. A three-way ANOVA was first conducted on the whole sample and then on the intuitive and reflective groups separately. This study suggests that differences in cognitive dispositions can significantly impact the folk understanding of philosophical concepts, and thus suggests that analysis of folk concepts should take cognitive dispositions into account

Cumbre de Viena : energía, polarización y búsqueda de liderazgos

La IV Cumbre Unión Europea - América Latina y el Caribe (UE-ALC), celebrada en Viena los días 11, 12 y 13 de mayo, estuvo marcada por una creciente polarización interna latinoamericana, por los problemas europeos para definir un liderazgo sobre el futuro del proyecto de integración y por la crisis global de energía

Mejoramiento del proceso de producción de la planta de barnices en la empresa Tintas S.A. Sunchemical

En la actualidad, la creciente competencia en el mercado y la obligación de satisfacer la demanda interna de barniz, ha hecho necesario mejorar el proceso de producción de éste subproducto en la empresa Tintas S.A. Sunchemical y de esta forma aprovechar de mejor manera los recursos existentes y responder a tiempo con la entrega de este producto intermedio usado en la fabricación de tintas -- Con este proyecto se pretende implementar acciones que permitan mejorar el proceso de producción de la planta de barnices en la empresa Tintas S.A. Sunchemical, partiendo de un diagnóstico realizado al proceso productivo existente, en el cual se identificaron los factores críticos más relevantes en la producción de los 4 principales barnices, que representan el 80% de la producción -- Este diagnóstico fue realizado basándose en la información recopilada con los empleados de la planta, la posterior elaboración de un diagrama causa-efecto y la ponderación porcentual de cada uno de los problemas, lo que llevó a seleccionar, con un diagrama de Pareto, los 5 factores críticos que más retardan el proceso productivo -- Una vez analizados, medidos y cuantificados dichos factores, se procede a implementar acciones orientadas a solucionarlos -- El impacto generado por las acciones implementadas se puede verificar gracias al análisis de los resultados obtenidos y al uso de indicadores de gestión, que al final del proyecto permiten evidenciar la mejoría en el proceso de producción de barnice